注:本文(wén)內(nèi)容主要(yào)摘錄自(z$<♠ì)美(měi)國(guó)知(zhī)乎★♣quora上(shàng)相(xiàng)關的(de)發言，并非我₽÷自(zì)己的(de)看(kàn)法，分(fēn)享到↑π∞(dào)這(zhè)裡(lǐ)為(wèi)大(dà)家(jiā)提供一(yī)個♠ (gè)借鑒參考。

正文(wén)如(rú)下(xià)：

     “卡脖子(zǐ)”的(de)表述很λ₹™←(hěn)形象，借用(yòng)到(dào)核心¥♣技(jì)術(shù)中來(lái)，那(nà)就(jiù)說(shuō)明φ₩ ≤(míng)這(zhè)項技(jì)術(shù)非常關鍵，在一(yī)個(gè)∏δ項目或一(yī)個(gè)産品中，“卡脖子(zǐ)”技(jì)術(♦σ•♠shù)的(de)重要(yào)性不(bù)言而喻。我們常用(y‍∏λ®òng)的(de)電(diàn)腦(nǎo)核心芯片、高(gā×<​o)端手機(jī)核心芯片、存儲設備、視(shì)頻(pín)系統中顯示驅動芯£‌>'片、數(shù)字信号處理(lǐ)設備芯片，及可(kě)編程邏輯設備核←π₽心芯片等，都(dōu)是(shì)中國(guó)自(zì∞✔)己造不(bù)出來(lái)的(de)高(gāo)端芯片，幾乎完全依賴進口≠ε，在這(zhè)些(xiē)産品中，中國(guó)自(zì)産芯片在全球的(de)市(shì) •  場(chǎng)占有(yǒu)率連1%都(dōu)不(bù)到(dào)，甚至絕大(dà)部分(f¶≈∞÷ēn)低(dī)于0.5%。

       "‌;這(zhè)樣的(de)現(xiàn)狀下(xià₩β≠)，高(gāo)端芯片自(zì)然就(jiù)成了§♦←(le)“卡脖子(zǐ)”問(wèn)題，原☆≈因是(shì)極大(dà)的(de)需求量和(h↔®‌×é)極低(dī)的(de)自(zì)供給量，所以美(měi)國(guó)制'>(zhì)裁華為(wèi)，殺手锏就(jiù)是(shì)™"€芯片。近(jìn)期在美(měi)版知(zhī)乎論壇上(shàn♣≠g)就(jiù)有(yǒu)這(zhè)樣的(de)一(yī)個(gè)π©>話(huà)題引起各國(guó)網友(yǒu)的(de)熱(rè)→> →議(yì)：“美(měi)國(guó)向荷蘭施壓，阻止荷蘭ASML公司向中芯國(guó)際出售 &₽∑EUV設備，最終影(yǐng)響了(le)中國(guó)♣→的(de)技(jì)術(shù)夢”。美(měi)國(guó)能(néng)壓制(₹¥zhì)中國(guó)芯片發展多(duō)久?

      &nb≤πsp;讓我們也(yě)來(lái)看(kàn)看(kàn)國(guó)外™≥£(wài)民(mín)間(jiān)網友(yǒπ→u)對(duì)這(zhè)個(gè)問(wèn)題的(de)的(de)觀點吧(σ∞♣ba)！

話(huà)題內(nèi)容

荷蘭半導體(tǐ)工(gōng)程師(shī)的(de)觀點

I think I am the perfec↓εt person to answer this. ♦✔Ω‌I have been working in the semic↓‌α©onductor industry for years©π•, currently living in the Netherlands, lived a©δ↓±nd worked in China for 3 years, ¶®☆ I know a lot of engineers from ASML (expeci♠Ωally after they hire∞™↔d hundreds of Turkish engineers).

我認為(wèi)我是(shì)回答(dá)這(zhè)個(gè)問(wèn)題的(de)最'♥£σ佳人(rén)選。我在半導體(tǐ)行(xíng)業(yè)工(gōng)作(zu‌£ò)多(duō)年(nián)，目前生(shēng)活在荷  ∑蘭，在中國(guó)生(shēng)活和∞∞'(hé)工(gōng)作(zuò)了(le)3年(nián)，我認識很(hěn)≈≤多(duō)來(lái)自(zì)ASML的(de)工(gōng)程師(shī)(特别是(δ shì)他(tā)們雇傭了(le)數(shù)百名土∞↔(tǔ)耳其工(gōng)程師(shī)後)。

Let me tell you something: High ↔-end semiconductor manufacturing is blac←"k magic. Both the processes and tools used fo∑★₹πr it are very complex. ASML’s EUV lithog&πraphy machine is probably the most complex tool h←π↓umankind ever developed since i®©"t stopped jumping between trees. I♥πt took billions of Euros and decades ofΩ ₹¥ experience to perfect it. Other experienced ♠&φlithography machine suppliers f←÷×'ailed at it. China has no experience in high-end≤∞ semiconductor manufac∑₹λ®turing tools with the exception of o≥∑δφne-off/few-off prototypes.

讓我告訴你(nǐ)：高(gāo)端半導體(tǐ)制(zh♣÷☆ì)造是(shì)一(yī)種黑(hēi)魔法。它所使用(yòng)的(de)≈↑∏♣過程和(hé)工(gōng)具都(dōu)非常複雜(zá♥↑↓)。ASML的(de)EUV光(guāng)刻機(jī)可(kě)能(néng)是(shì)人(r✘÷​én)類發明(míng)的(de)最複雜(zá)的(de)工(gōng)‌σ∏ 具，因為(wèi)它不(bù)再在樹(shù)之間(jiā₽±©n)跳(tiào)躍。它花(huā)費(fèi)了(le)數(shù)€♦十億歐元和(hé)幾十年(nián)的(de)經驗來(lái)完善它<∑∑。其他(tā)經驗豐富的(de)光(guā€←®ng)刻機(jī)供應商在這(zhè)方面失敗了(le)。☆$中國(guó)在高(gāo)端半導體(tǐ)制(zhì)造工(gōng)✔₹具方面沒有(yǒu)經驗，除了(le)一(yī)次性或少(shǎo)量≠↔↓€的(de)原型。

ASML’s EUV lithography machine. Needs 4 §✔γ1 semi-trucks to get transpo↓§₩rted, costs $150 million, has 100.0✘ 00 major parts, has miαβ​©rrors that need months of grindΩ₩ing to reach needed smooth↔→ness, needs multiple people with Ph♣↕§☆D’s as machine operato•βrs. Quite high-tech. Isn’t it?

ASML公司的(de)EUV光(guān‍¶¶g)刻機(jī)。運輸需要(yào)41輛(liàng)半卡車(chē≈‌→)，耗資1.5億美(měi)元，有(yǒu)10萬個(gè)主要(yào)部件(jiàn☆'$​)，鏡子(zǐ)需要(yào)數(shù)月(yuè)的(de)打磨才能(néng)γ↓∏達到(dào)所需的(de)光(guāng)滑程度，需要(yào)多(duō™$)名擁有(yǒu)博士學位的(de)人(rén)作(zuò)為(•♣™Ωwèi)機(jī)器(qì)操作(zuò)員(yuán)。很(hěn¥ ←®)高(gāo)科(kē)技(jì)。不(b✘↔↓£ù)是(shì)嗎(ma)?

EUV光(guāng)刻機(jī)

Unfortunately, ASML is a very convenient targe←φt for the USA. The company uses a lot of✔± critical parts from ₩÷§Ωthe USA but those parts don’t represent a₹≥¶δnything significant in the US∏Ωα§ economy in terms of their monetary valueΩ♦☆. Chinese electronics indus₽×try still depends on foreign chi€‌ps so it can not threaten fabs with banning '★∞σthe sale of chips in Ch ♥ ‍ina that were manufactu ₩red using ASML tools. Also, China isn’t a big γ§≤customer of ASML too. In short, China ∑'can not answer with reciprocal sanctions.

不(bù)幸的(de)是(shì)，ASML對(β₽$duì)美(měi)國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)是(sh ¥ì)一(yī)個(gè)非常方便的(de)目标。該公司使用(yòng)了(le)許多('>duō)來(lái)自(zì)美(měi•≤↔)國(guó)的(de)關鍵部件(jiàn)，但(dàn)這(zhè)些(xiπ>λ&ē)部件(jiàn)的(de)貨币價值在美(měi)國(guó)經濟中并≠ ε 不(bù)代表任何重要(yào)的(de)東(dōng)西(xī)。中國(guó)電φα↕(diàn)子(zǐ)行(xíng)業(yè)仍依賴外(wài)國(guó)芯片ε↓，因此無法通(tōng)過禁止在中國(guó)銷售使用(yòng)ASML工(gōn✘Ωg)具生(shēng)産的(de)芯片來(lái)威脅晶片廠(chǎπ₩ng)。此外(wài)，中國(guó)也(yě)不(bù)是(shì)阿斯麥的(d¥'∞e)大(dà)客戶。總之，中國(guó)不(bù)能(néng)以對(duì)等制(zhì)裁"©↓作(zuò)為(wèi)回應。

Is China hopeless? No.

中國(guó)絕望了(le)? 不(bù)！

1- All of those tools are engineered and made by≠™&γ humans, and the laws of p¥✘♠hysics are the same both in the Netherland✘÷s and China. If the Netherlands could, then the$φre is no reason for anybody else to fail wε↑±ith the correct approach∑≠.

1-所有(yǒu)這(zhè)些(xiē)工(gōng)具都(dōu)是(≤☆shì)由人(rén)類設計(jì)和(hé)制(zhì)£₩β÷造的(de)，而且物(wù)理(lǐ)定律在荷蘭和(hé)中國("£↔guó)都(dōu)是(shì)相(xiàng)同的(de)。≥>✘如(rú)果荷蘭可(kě)以，那(nà)麽其他(€✔®εtā)國(guó)家(jiā)就(jiù)沒有(y>♦ǒu)理(lǐ)由用(yòng)正确的(de)方法失敗。

2- China is filthy rich cαεΩ±ompared to the Netherlands. Chinese economy ©®≤÷is 17x of the Netherlands’, 9x of SK’s, 27x o•≤₽f Taiwan’s, 3+x of Japan’s. With state support, Cλ↔hinese fabs and tool makers can hir≈↕αe the top people from the rest of the w≥←§£orld with salaries ASML, LamResearch, AM,​σ£ Synopsys, TSMC, Samsung, … simply ca♥≤σ♠n not compete with. A significant portion o×≠÷f these companies’ employees are expats anyway, ε​most of them are jus™↑t after money.

2、中國(guó)比荷蘭富得(de)流油。中國(g¶λuó)經濟是(shì)荷蘭的(de)17≠♣倍，SK的(de)9倍，中國(guó)台灣地(d ¶¥¶ì)區(qū)的(de)27倍，日(rì)本的(de)3倍。在國(guó)家(jiā)的"‍(de)支持下(xià)，中國(guó)的(de)晶圓廠(chǎng)和(hé)工(gōnπ✔ g)具制(zhì)造商可(kě)以用(yòng)AS✔‍ML、LamResearch、AM、Synopsys、台積電(diàn)、三星等公司無法¥≥≥→與之競争的(de)薪水(shuǐ)從(cóng)世界其他(tā)地(dì)方雇≈↑傭頂尖人(rén)才。這(zhè)些(xiē)公司↓×σ的(de)員(yuán)工(gōng)中有(yǒu)很(hěn)大(‍‌∏®dà)一(yī)部分(fēn)是(shì)外(wài)國(guó)人(rén)，他(tā)們中的♣☆(de)大(dà)多(duō)數(shù)隻是(shì)₹€為(wèi)了(le)錢(qián)。

In fact China is already doing this successfully™★↔ with good results. Fo ↔≥αr example, it already has a working EUV lithograp≥✔εhy machine prototype, alr♥₩eady caught up with the rest in chi✔‌•✘p testing, packaging, wafer production, als→​∑o its first immersion lithog↑α←₹raphy machine (good enough for most thingsγ↔≤←) is getting prepared for commercial use.

事(shì)實上(shàng)，中國(guó)已經成功地(dì)做(zuò)到(dào)了(←∞le)這(zhè)一(yī)點，并取得(de'☆)了(le)良好(hǎo)的(de)成果。例如(rú)，它已經€♦βφ有(yǒu)了(le)一(yī)台工(gōng)作(zuò)中的(de)EUV光(g‍₽∏₽uāng)刻機(jī)原型，在芯片測試、封裝、晶圓生(shēng)産方面已經趕上(shàng)了(¶αφle)其他(tā)公司，同時(shí)它的(de)第一(×€ yī)台浸沒式光(guāng)刻機(jī)(對(duì)大(dà)多(duō)數(s¥®hù)事(shì)情來(lái)說(shuō)已經足夠好(hǎ‍ o)了(le))也(yě)準備投入商業(yè)使用(yòn•↑✘g)。

3- China is a scientific powe✔∞&&rhouse on its own. It is the coun☆ try with most patent applications, most res♠★αearch output, graduates more STEM students t→←¶•han any other country, 2nd la←×↔rgest R&D spender, has 11 unive®™rsities in top 100. This l≥ ₩eads us to my first poinσ×€t. If the Netherlands could, so can China i©¶$f given enough time.

中國(guó)本身(shēn)就(jiù)是(≥≈↔shì)一(yī)個(gè)科(kē)學強國(guó)。它是(shì)專βγ利申請(qǐng)最多(duō)、研究産出最多(duō)的(de)國(guó)家(jiā)，STE​®M專業(yè)的(de)畢業(yè)生(shēng)比其他(₽™λtā)任何國(guó)家(jiā)都(dōu)多(duō)，研發支出排名第二，有(yǒu)11所大♠α≤(dà)學進入前100名。這(zhè)就(jiù)引出了(le)我的(de♣•​)第一(yī)點。如(rú)果荷蘭可(kě)以，那(nà)麽隻 ≠‍≥要(yào)給中國(guó)足夠的(de)時(shí)間(jiān)，中≈→國(guó)也(yě)可(kě)以。

4- Catching up is much easier than innoπ≈vating. Knowing something is pos™βsible and having a gene£₹‌ ral knowledge of how it works make things much₽φ♣© easier.

趕超比創新容易得(de)多(duō)。知(zhī)道(dào)£>δ∑某件(jiàn)事(shì)是(shì)可(kě)能(néng)的(de)，并且對(duì)它的(λ£☆de)工(gōng)作(zuò)原理(lǐ)有(yǒu)一(yī)個($§gè)大(dà)緻的(de)了(le)解會(hu™≈ì)讓事(shì)情變得(de)容易得(de)多(duō'×)。

5- Time is on the Chinese sid‌₽∞§e. Technology of semiconducto≥γ​rs is close to maturity/stalling (ch×↑≤oose the word depending $÷on your view). If the development♥✔γφ slows (which it does) it ÷π≈$gives China the opportunity tγσ​o catch-up. If a tech revolution happ↑"ens, then the playing field eve∏>←αns out anyway.

5-時(shí)間(jiān)在中國(guó)這(zhè)邊。半導體™©ε♥(tǐ)技(jì)術(shù)接近(jìn)成熟/停滞(根據你(nǐ)的♣₽↕(de)觀點選擇這(zhè)個(gè)詞)。如(rú)果發展放(fàng)緩(确實∏'β 如(rú)此)，中國(guó)就(jiù)有(yǒu)機(jī)會(huì)迎頭趕上(shàng'α)。如(rú)果科(kē)技(jì)革命發生(shēng)了(le)，那(nà)麽競争環∏®境無論如(rú)何都(dōu)是(shì)公平的(de)。

6- You don’t need EUV for the mo✘₹st things. You don’t even need high-end proce§÷sses for the most things. T↔₽∞here is more to semiconductors$✔Ω✘ than the latest smartphone p≠$​¥rocessors, GPUs, and C→<↔PUs. Look at iPhone 12 teardown videos. Yo♥©∏u will see a lot of chips. Only on∏∏∑e of them needs EUV. An average moder€∏>n car has 250+ computers inside. That means t✔​₩housands of chips. All of them are manufactured ↕π♣using old processes. This is even more true for↑>εβ military and space applications. T∏γ®hose use very old chips that are ε¥εknown to be reliable and sec$βure.

6-大(dà)多(duō)數(shù)事(shì ≤↔≥)情都(dōu)不(bù)需要(yào)EUV。大(dà)多β¥✔(duō)數(shù)事(shì)情你(nǐ)甚↓β至不(bù)需要(yào)高(gāo)端的(de)流程。半導體(tǐ)不(bù)僅僅是(shìσφ")最新的(de)智能(néng)手機(jīΩ☆₩♣)處理(lǐ)器(qì)、圖形處理(lǐ)器(→↓™₹qì)(gpu)和(hé)cpu。看(kànε>₩≥)看(kàn)iPhone 12拆卸的(de)¶π視(shì)頻(pín)。你(nǐ)會(huì)看(kàn)到(dào)很(hěn)多(d ‍$uō)芯片。隻有(yǒu)一(yī)個(gè)Ωδ×需要(yào)EUV。一(yī)輛(liàng)普通(tōng)的( ₩Ωde)現(xiàn)代汽車(chē)內(nèi)部有(yǒα±u)250台電(diàn)腦(nǎo)。這(zhè)意味著(zhe' )成千上(shàng)萬的(de)芯片。所有(yǒu)這(zhè)些₽✔(xiē)都(dōu)是(shì)用(yòng)舊(jiù)工(gōng)藝制(&α↔zhì)造的(de)。在軍事(shì)和(hé)太空(kōng)應用(yòng)方面更是(sh★≠ì)如(rú)此。它們使用(yòng)的(de)是(shì)非常老(lǎo)舊(↓♦jiù)的(de)芯片，但(dàn)已知(zhī)是(s✘↔★₽hì)可(kě)靠和(hé)安全的(de)。

Conclusion: Blocking ASML from ©₽selling EUV machines to China caβλε§n hurt Chinese businesses for some time bu★ t in the grand scheme it is insignificant. The UγγπSA needs to run faster rather than keep tr≠₹↑♥ying to block China i¶ •f it wants to preserve its dominance↓✘≠ in tech.

結論：阻止ASML向中國(guó)銷售EUV設備可(kě)能(n$★•éng)會(huì)在一(yī)段時(shí)間(jiān)內(n€★èi)傷害中國(guó)企業(yè)，但(dàn)從(cóng)長(cháng)遠(yuǎn)來γ€₩¶(lái)看(kàn)，這(zhè)是(shì)微(wēi)不(bù)足道(dào)的(de)↔∑。如(rú)果美(měi)國(guó)想要(yào)保持其在科(kē)技(jì)領域的(de)÷±£‌主導地(dì)位，它需要(yào)跑得(de)更快(kuài)，而不(b∏∏•ù)是(shì)一(yī)直試圖阻止中國(guó)。

An update on the Chi÷♠§±nese EUV light source: New Options for Synchro≈¥"tron Light Sources

中國(guó)極紫外(wài)光(guānαφg)源的(de)更新：同步加速器(qì)光(guāng)源的(de)新選擇

It seems the basic r≈♦$esearch is complete and the method co♠¶♣→mpletely different than of ASML’s.

看(kàn)來(lái)基礎研究已經完成，方法和(hé)ASML的(de)完全不(bù)同。

德國(guó)網友(yǒu)的(de)觀點

This EUV thing has been adopted into China₩β♦Ω’s 14th 5-year plan which has bee≠ n started since this y∞βear. And for the record, China has never "←βmissed a single deadline for the past 13 ♠↔≥5-year plans. So it’s safe to say that Chδ&ina will have this thing by 2026. So speaking of ‍♣∏the US resisting China’s development, it wo♦↑uld be 4 more years for this particul♥₹&¶ar item.

EUV項目已被納入今年(nián)啓動的(de)中國(guó)第14個(gè)五年(nián)<♥計(jì)劃。根據記錄，在過去(qù)的(de)13✘&✘ 個(gè)五年(nián)計(jì)劃中"✔<σ，中國(guó)從(cóng)未錯(cuò)過>♦☆任何一(yī)個(gè)最後期限。所以可(kěε₩γ)以肯定地(dì)說(shuō)，中國(guó)将在2026年(nián)擁有(yǒ✘δ$u)它。所以說(shuō)到(dào)美(měi)國(guó)抵制(zh₹↑÷§ì)中國(guó)的(de)發展，這(zhè)個(gè)項目還(hái)需要(yào) ∏​'4年(nián)。

And the good thing for China having the EUV♠ε∞ equipment is that the price of the equipment ☆♣¶₹will be significantly dropped. So I guess t​∏≠♦hat would be a benefit of the en§✘tire world.

中國(guó)擁有(yǒu)EUV設備的(de)好(hǎo)處是(shì)，設備的(de)價格将大 ∞↕€(dà)幅下(xià)降。所以我想這(zhè)對(duì)整個(gè)世界都(d₩↓"®ōu)有(yǒu)好(hǎo)處。

America is ALREADY behind China in so MANY as♦☆♦✔pects and they are still denyin↑&✔g and avoiding the thought that America m ‌ •ight one day second to C≈€≥​hina. That frightens many Americans. ∞ §

美(měi)國(guó)在很(hěn)多(duō)方面已經落後于中國(guó)了(lα↑​βe)，他(tā)們還(hái)在否認和(hé)避免美(měi)國(guó)有(y≠™ǒu)一(yī)天會(huì)落後于中國(guó)的(Ω£↔de)想法。這(zhè)讓許多(duō)美(měi)國(guπ™₹←ó)人(rén)感到(dào)害怕。

No matter how ineffective many of t→↓he counter-China measures, e.×☆λg. trade war, Americans have ÷✔and are to put in place, the©←y will keep doing the same things  ↕&and getting themselves hurt before China≠• does.

無論許多(duō)繁華措施有(yǒu)多(duō)₩₽無效，例如(rú)貿易戰，美(měi)國(guó)人(rén)已經并将付諸實施，他(tā)≤ ∏們将繼續做(zuò)同樣的(de)事(s₩¶∞hì)情，他(tā)們會(huì)主動出擊而不(bù)是(shì)等待中♠¥₩國(guó)超越他(tā)們。

The Chinese are the most industγ rious race on earth.

中國(guó)人(rén)是(shì)世界上(shàng)最勤勞的(de)民(mín)∞≠÷族。

Necessity is the mother o♠​f Invention.

需求是(shì)發明(míng)之母

The Chinese will find a way. The more you suppr☆¥ess them and the more"♦' you try to deny them the techno™↕βlogy - they will begin to make it on th↕ eir own and they will slowly do better and better δ'.

中國(guó)人(rén)會(huì)找到(dào)辦法的(de)。你(nǐ)越是(shì)壓制(™±±​zhì)他(tā)們，你(nǐ)越是(shì)試圖否π♠認他(tā)們的(de)技(jì)術(sh≠™ù)，他(tā)們就(jiù)會(huì)開(kāi)始自(↕ ←zì)己創造，慢(màn)慢(màn)地(dì)做(zuò)₽πγ♠得(de)越來(lái)越好(hǎo)。

Chips is the best example.

芯片就(jiù)是(shì)最好(hǎo)的(de)例子(zǐ)。

As long as Taiwan kept suppl § ying them the chips - The Chinese were hap‌×↑py. They focused on other things

隻要(yào)台積電(diàn)繼續向他(tā)們供應芯片——中國(guó)人(rén)£€就(jiù)很(hěn)高(gāo)興。然後會(huì)他(tā)們專注于其他(tā←←∞φ)事(shì)情。

江蘇南(nán)京的(de)台積電(diàn)工(gōng)廠(chǎng)

The Minute Trump decided to threaten the Chinese β×- they decided to get their act toge₹≠¥πther and start making their own ch÷γips. They will start with inferior ones but inβδ>¶ 10 years - they will붥 outmanufacture Taiwan >¥at 1/3 the cost and take away the ★✘∏ market.

特朗普決定威脅他(tā)們那(nà)一(yī)刻起，他(tā)們就(σ£jiù)會(huì)齊心協力開(kāi)始制 ♦(zhì)作(zuò)自(zì)己的(de)芯片。他(tā)們一(yī)開(kāiΩ♦)始會(huì)用(yòng)劣質産品，但(dàn)10年(nián)後，他(tā)們的✘πλ (de)生(shēng)産成本将是(shì)台積電(diàn)的(de)三分(f₹∑©ēn)之一(yī)，并奪走市(shì)場(chǎng)。

The US may try again and again but

美(měi)國(guó)人(rén)可(kě)能(néng)✔☆會(huì)一(yī)次又(yòu)一(yī)次地(dì)嘗試，但(dàn✔≥)是(shì)：

(a) They waited too long. China♠↕© is too rich today. They have too much money.

他(tā)們會(huì)等得(de)很(hěn)久。今天的(de±< ')中國(guó)太富裕了(le)。他(tā)們有(y←©®ǒu)太多(duō)的(de)錢(qián)。

(b) China has too many tentacles in foreign co→☆ £untries. Thousands of Chinese in va&¥'¶rious industries who are ÷☆£×experts.

中國(guó)在國(guó)外(wài)涉及的λ★(de)領域太多(duō)。數(shù)以千計(jì)的(de)華人(ré' n)專家(jiā)分(fēn)布在各行(xíng)各業(yè)。

In Space alone - China ​φ÷was behind India until 2010 - but↓​±  today - they have their own Mapping ₹✘System for their huge ‍σ​→landmass as well as are in th§ e position of becomi®♥>ng the Third country in the globe to land o¶βn Mars - having landed on the moon.

僅在太空(kōng)方面——中國(guó)在2010年(nián)之前一↕δ(yī)直落後于印度（原文(wén)如(↓♠ ‍rú)此，譯者注）——但(dàn)今天——他(tā)們擁有(yǒu)自(zì)己的(de)龐大(dàσΩΩ​)陸地(dì)測繪系統，并處于成為(wèi)全球第三個(gè)登陸火(huǒ)星的(de)國(gσ$uó)家(jiā)的(de)位置——已經登陸了×Ω✔(le)月(yuè)球。

China and Russia are on the®±÷ verge of building their own International &≠∏Space Station having bσ↓oth the financial muscle and♣©Ω  technology.

中國(guó)和(hé)俄羅斯即将建立自(zì)己Ω ∑δ的(de)國(guó)際空(kōng)間(jiā↑ ✘™n)站(zhàn)，他(tā)們既有(yǒu)‌™Ω财力又(yòu)有(yǒu)技(jì)術(shù)。

You cannot bully or intimidate or stifle Progreσ₹‍ss. Eventually Life finds¥•<  a way.

你(nǐ)們不(bù)能(néng)靠欺淩、恐吓或扼殺進步。↔≥最終，生(shēng)活找到(dào)了(  ✘>le)一(yī)條路(lù)。

US should learn this €•§↕lesson hard. The more theyλ® try - they may get 10 years more but γ€λ↓in the end China will get there and take ∑® over.

美(měi)國(guó)應該好(hǎo)好(hǎo)吸取教訓。他(tā)們嘗試得(de)越多(du✔×∏£ō)——他(tā)們可(kě)能(néng)最晚在十年(nián)內(nè↑∑✘•i)達到(dào)同等的(de)技(jì)術(shù)并接管整個(gè)市(shì)場♣&≥(chǎng)。

It might be quite awhile, but there are many var₽≥iables that’s in play.

這(zhè)可(kě)能(néng)需要(y ‍'∑ào)一(yī)段時(shí)間(jiān)，但(dàn)有(yǒu)很(hěn÷•‌φ)多(duō)變數(shù)在發揮作(zuò)用(yòng)。

It should be noted that NO c®✔±☆ountry at this point can produce t>∞he ASML EUV equipment on its own (or↕↓ even the older generation DUV is questionable), →©€ASML relies heavily on suppliers λ≤from Germany / UK / US / Japan ≈$etc as well to make their equipment, Japan might₽&÷α be the closest country that can pΩ∞'∏roduce a similar (but older generat↕>ion) equipment relying only on <₹★company / tech inside their border.

需要(yào)注意的(de)是(shì)，目前'♥₹€沒有(yǒu)哪個(gè)國(guó)家(jiā)可(kě)以自(zγλì)己生(shēng)産ASML的(de)EUV設備(甚至老(lǎo)一(yī)代的(de)D≤¶↑UV也(yě)值得(de)懷疑)，ASML嚴重依賴德國(guó)/英國(≥ guó)/美(měi)國(guó)/日(rì)本等國(guó)的(de)供應商來(lái)生(s<≥hēng)産他(tā)們的(de)設備，日(rì)本可(kě)能(né₹×δ™ng)是(shì)最接近(jìn)能(néng)夠生(shēng)産類似(但(dà™₩n)老(lǎo)一(yī)代)設備的(de)國(guó∞☆≈€)家(jiā)，隻依賴本國(guó)的(de)公司↕π/技(jì)術(shù)。

As of right now the ASML not selling hig∞≥₽σhest-end EUV to China isn’t even real•♥∑ly a thing, because th∑§ey can’t produce enoδ>&γugh of them anyway, and the whole project m‍£anaged to get off the ∏ >ground because Intel / TSMC / Samsung fun  φded the project SPECIFICALLY so that ASML only r★€$¶eally sells to them that machine. it₽↔β ’s not just SMIC of China that€‍÷ can’t buy it, even global foundery of ∑✘↕‍the world can’t either.

就(jiù)目前而言，ASML不(bù)向中國(guó)銷售♦‌最高(gāo)規格的(de)EUV還(hái)算™Ω(suàn)不(bù)上(shàng)什(s •♥₽hén)麽，因為(wèi)他(tā)們無論如(rú)何都(dōu)無法生(shēn•σλ←g)産足夠多(duō)的(de)EUV，而且整個(gè)項目成功地(dì)啓動​ ✔δ了(le)，因為(wèi)英特爾/台積電(diàn)/₩↔♠ 三星專門(mén)資助了(le)這(zhè)個(gè)項目，所以ASML♦®¶ 隻向他(tā)們出售那(nà)台機(jī)器(qì)。不(bù)隻是(shì)中國(gu∞Ωó)的(de)中芯國(guó)際買不(bù)到(§¶$dào)它，就(jiù)連全球鑄造廠(ch♣₹"✘ǎng)也(yě)買不(bù)到(dào)。

There are many layers of problems t♠ε±o China building it’s own extre¥×me ultraviolet lithography mach♣→ ₽ines, but the most difficult is the fa☆♦↑"ct that EUV and the way TSMC & Samsung ↑"β±uses them are the extreme×‌✘¥ edge of precision engineering and manufacturi≈¶ng. something China has never b±§ ₩een particularly great at, for example, the ≥©↑y still struggle so far to b×"uild their own internal combβφ$ustion engines to the same level as Japan♣φ≠& / Germany (the two key→γ♥☆ powerhouse players in doing such ®∑things.)

中國(guó)制(zhì)造自(zì)己的(de)極紫外(wài)光(guāng)刻機(j★λ✔ī)存在許多(duō)層面的(de)問(wèn)題∞∑，但(dàn)最困難的(de)是(shì)EUVσ'​≤以及台積電(diàn)和(hé)三星使用(yòng)它們的(de)方式是(sh↕®÷$ì)精密工(gōng)程和(hé)制(zhì)造的(de)極端優勢。中國(guó)↔♣∏在這(zhè)方面從(cóng)來(lái)都(dōu)不(bù)是(shì)特别擅長ασ(cháng)，例如(rú)，到(dào)目前為(wèi)止，他(tā)們仍然在努力制(zhì)造≈εδ與日(rì)本/德國(guó)(這(zhè)兩個(gè)關≥φ≥↑鍵的(de)大(dà)國(guó)在做(zuò)這(zhΩ​'≥è)類事(shì)情)相(xiàng)同的(de)內(nèi)燃機(​→→jī)。

There are certainly po™&tential ways for China to r‌₹ Ωeengineer the process and come up with som≈€ething that has a relatively  γ$similar end result but relies on different teφ<σchnologies, however that would requ✔>€ire them to completely reinvent the whe £¥el of something that was basical→‌↕ly the collaboration of the whole world §±₽over decades on their owεδ ♣n. Again, that’s not IMPOSS‌ε±IBLE, but it’s certainly ex$≠tremely difficult and inefficient.

中國(guó)當然有(yǒu)可(kě)能(néng)重新設計(jì)這(zhè)一(yī)過程"≥，并提出一(yī)些(xiē)具有(yǒu)相(xiàng)對(π¶☆duì)相(xiàng)似的(de)最終結果，但(dàn)依賴不(bù)同技(jì★>→$)術(shù)的(de)東(dōng)西(xī)，但(dàn)這→↔Ω(zhè)将需要(yào)他(tā)們完全重新發明(míng)輪子(zǐ)的σ£(de)東(dōng)西(xī)，這(zhè)基本上(shàng★←☆§)是(shì)整個(gè)世界在幾十年(nián)的(de)合作(πφzuò)，靠自(zì)己。同樣，這(zhè)不(bù)是(shì)不(bù)可(kě©✘)能(néng)的(de)，但(dàn)✔→φ這(zhè)肯定是(shì)極其困難和(hé)低(dī)效的(de)。€≠

Not to mention that this is not a purely&Ω≥ scientific / engineering project, the  φ₽difference with TSMC winning over other ≤↑competitors is primarily ε​COST. i.e that it’s not that Intel CA ✔N’T do 7nm, they can≤←, it’s that their fai♦‍‌‍lure rate is much high ¶★er than TSMC that if say, Ap↔•←★ple relies only on Intel for their 7nm chip, tε≠♦hey’ll have to sell their iphone at a mu"​≈ch higher price and/or oneπ× of Intel or Apple (or both) go bankrupt☆∏↓.

且不(bù)說(shuō)這(zhè)不(bù)是(shì)一(yī)個₽<(gè)純粹的(de)科(kē)學/工(gōn>€≈g)程項目，台積電(diàn)與其他(tā)競争對(duì)☆←♥§手的(de)區(qū)别主要(yào)在于成本。也(yě)就(jiù)是(shì)說(shuō™'‌←)，不(bù)是(shì)英特爾不(bù)能(nénλΩg)做(zuò)7nm，而是(shì)他(tāα ♠)們可(kě)以，而是(shì)他(tā)們的(de)失敗率比台積電(diàn)高(gāo)得(d≥£e)多(duō)，如(rú)果蘋果隻依賴英特爾做(zuò)他♦γ£∏(tā)們的(de)7nm芯片，他(tā)們将不(bù)得(de)不(bù)以∑☆更高(gāo)的(de)價格出售他(tā)們的(de)iphone和(hé↔φ)/或英特爾或蘋果(或兩者)之一(yī)破産。

So even if China COULD reverse engineer orπ≤¥ re-engineer the EUV machine or subsiti©↑tute, if it doesn’t actua♦€'∞lly win out on a cost basis it’₩ →₩s basically useless commercially, an insanely exε≈pensive academic project (we’re talking ↔® about NASA level funding.) most impo∏₽≈rtantly, the US could simply s∑•hut out said machine using standards, and↓¥ for local chinese companies like SM∏‌♦IC to adapt a differε☆₽ent system would be extremλ∑><ely problematic.

因此，即使中國(guó)可(kě)以對(du♦×↑ì)EUV機(jī)器(qì)進行(xíng)逆向工(gōng)程或重☆∑•新設計(jì)或替代，如(rú)果它在成本上(sh ≥àng)沒有(yǒu)真正赢得(de)勝利，它在商業(yè)上(shàng←×₹★)基本上(shàng)是(shì)無用(yòng)的(de)，↓∑₽一(yī)個(gè)瘋狂昂貴的(de)學術(shù)項目(我們說(shuō)£≤的(de)是(shì)NASA水(shuǐ)平的(de)資金(jīn)。)最重要(§≥≈→yào)的(de)是(shì)，美(měi)國(guó)可(k★♠Ωě)以簡單地(dì)排除使用(yòng)标準的(d₽σ¥e)機(jī)器(qì)，而對(duì)中國(guó)本土(tǔ)公司✘↑¶ ，如(rú)中芯國(guó)際适應一(yī)個™$≥(gè)不(bù)同的(de)系統将是(shì)非常有(yǒu)問(wèn)題的(de)。

Is it POSSIBLE if China just lik&≈e nationalize SMIC anΩ₹"d stuff? yeah, but it would in the grande★ ©↕r scheme of things, be pretty closeβ♦§ to cutting off your own nose to spit your e★★nemy. China would effect¥≤↔≈ively be abandoning the world ma'₹rket for decades in such a ☆£§♥scenario. and probably move slower t‌λ♦han their competitors.

如(rú)果中國(guó)把中芯國(guó)際國(guó)有(y≤←ǒu)化(huà)，可(kě)能(néng)嗎€₩¶(ma)?沒錯(cuò)，但(dàn)從(cóng)©¥更大(dà)的(de)角度來(lái)說(shuō)，這(¥βzhè)就(jiù)像是(shì)割下(xià)自(zì)己的(de)鼻≥σ子(zǐ)來(lái)唾棄你(nǐ)的(de)敵人(rén)。在這(zhè)種情況下(xλ∏•∏ià)，中國(guó)實際上(shàng₩★™)是(shì)在幾十年(nián)內(nèi)放(fàng)棄世界市(shì)場(chǎng)‌‍。而且可(kě)能(néng)比他(tā₹&)們的(de)競争對(duì)手行(xíng)動更慢(màn)。

What China SHOULD do, is what they have <λbeen doing most of the time (some major exceσ☆ptions of terrible mistakeγ÷÷§s and frauds non-withstanding.) whichβ& is to try and gradually move up the chain and e$λε‌stablish more and more companies in this field an•&d hope that some of them eventually hold a ↑•$major niche that becomes almost indispe→σnsable in this field¶δ©₩. I’d say that most of the actual worker↔×s / players in this '‌"±field in China understand★×γs this and is more or less trying to do thatφσ§.

中國(guó)應該做(zuò)的(de)，是§π&(shì)他(tā)們在大(dà)多(duō)數(shù)時(shí)候一(yī)直在做(zuò)α λ的(de)(盡管存在一(yī)些(xiē)嚴₩®重的(de)錯(cuò)誤和(hé)欺詐)，那γ§(nà)就(jiù)是(shì)嘗試并逐步向上(shàn>∑δ§g)移動鏈條，在這(zhè)個(gè)領域建立•'越來(lái)越多(duō)的(de)公司，并希望其$♠中一(yī)些(xiē)公司最終在這(zhè)個(gè)領域占據一(yī)個(gè)幾乎不(bù∏→≤)可(kě)或缺的(de)主要(yào)利基。我想說(shuō)的(de)是(γ↔shì)，中國(guó)這(zhè)個(gè)領域的(de)大(dà)多(↓©€≈duō)數(shù)實際工(gōng)作(zuò)者/參與者≈☆↕都(dōu)明(míng)白(bái)這(zhè)一(yī)點，并或多σ≤π(duō)或少(shǎo)地(dì)試圖λπ$≈這(zhè)樣做(zuò)。

But just to remind people, semi c​✔onductor’s main raw material input 멧is Silicon

但(dàn)提醒大(dà)家(jiā)一ε®"(yī)下(xià)，半導體(tǐ)的(de)主要(yào)原材料是(shì)矽。

So just to give an idea what shutting out÷α ↑ China REALLY looks like.

所以，讓我們看(kàn)看(kàn)把中國(guó)拒之門(mén)外"π≤♣(wài)到(dào)底是(shì)什(shén)麽£©↔ 樣子(zǐ)。

Now that’s the part onπ®β why it’s a major problem for China, the othe♣₽₹r side of the coin is that the US is incre♣★"♥asingly playing a dangerous game as well and ♣σβδcould blow up its own advα‍™antages or worse.

這(zhè)就(jiù)是(shì)為(wèi)什(shén)麽它是(shì)£®★®中國(guó)的(de)一(yī)個(gè)主要(yào)問(wèn)題，硬币的(<£de)另一(yī)面是(shì)，美(měi)國(guó)也(yě)在越來(lái)越多(duō)'÷©地(dì)玩(wán)一(yī)個(gè)危險的(de)遊®∑戲，可(kě)能(néng)會(huì)摧♣≤毀自(zì)己的(de)優勢，甚至更糟。

If you’re ASML and the EU in general, you $±’re not exactly thrilled to ba×α↑sically have the US policy fo<↓λφrced upon you as well. and♠≠σ← would probably now actively think about h↔✔aving replacement tech fα©δor the US/UK stuff if possible so that y'₩ou have at least political and econo₩↔↔♣mic independence (i.e even if they d±§€on’t sell to China, it’s on $βφ their terms and not ÷®because the US commanded them to do so↑∞ π.) and once that happens the next potentia✘↑←l moves by US and others could become quite scar ♣y.

如(rú)果你(nǐ)是(shì)ASML和(hé)歐盟≤‌，你(nǐ)不(bù)會(huì)因為(wèi)美(měi)國(guó)的(de)政策強加給你(®€nǐ)而感到(dào)興奮。如(rú)果可(kě)能(néng)的(de)‍♥​話(huà)，現(xiàn)在可(kě)能(néng)會(huì)積極考™←‍慮擁有(yǒu)替代美(měi)國(guó)/英國(guó)産品的(de)技(jì)術(shù)δ™≠§，這(zhè)樣你(nǐ)至少(shǎo)有(yǒu)政治和(hé)經濟獨立(也(yě∞≈)就(jiù)是(shì)說(shuō)，即使他(tā)們不(bù)賣給中國(guó₽')，這(zhè)是(shì)根據他(tā)們的(de)條件(jiàn)，而不(bù)是♠γ(shì)因為(wèi)美(měi)國(guó)命令他(tā)們這(z¶‌hè)麽做(zuò))，一(yī)旦發生(shēng)這(zhè)種情況，美(měi)國(♣βguó)和(hé)其他(tā)國(guó)家(jiā)的(de)下(x€¥♥≠ià)一(yī)個(gè)潛在舉動可(kě)能(néng)會‌&"§(huì)變得(de)非常可(kě)怕。

It should be generally noted th✘δ→at the EU and other US allies is actua" lly paying almost all the ←☆price for the trade war/ geopolitical ™↓©struggle with China / Russia whilδ→e the US is benefitti ≥​♥ng at their expense.

需要(yào)指出的(de)是(shì)，歐盟和(hé)美(měi)國(guó)的(d♥λ♠™e)其他(tā)盟友(yǒu)實際上(shàng)為(wèi)與中國(guó)/≥ 俄羅斯的(de)貿易付出了(le)幾乎所有(yǒu)的(de)代價，而美(měi)↔€∞©國(guó)卻從(cóng)他(tā)們的(de)損失中受益。

So far if one look at★φ↑☆ the score board it’s pretty much the >δוUS wins and everyone else (friend or¥‌ foe) loses with a few small exceptio×‍σns.

到(dào)目前為(wèi)止，如(rú)果你(nǐ)看(kàn)一Ω®Ωδ(yī)下(xià)記分(fēn)牌，基本上(shàng)美(měi‌≈)國(guó)赢麻了(le)，其他(tā)所有(yǒu)人(rén)(朋(p≠₩"éng)友(yǒu)或敵人(rén))都(dōu)輸了(le)，隻有(yǒuφ£)一(yī)些(xiē)小(xiǎo)的(de)例外(wài)。

This is clearly unsustainable over the long ter ©&m, and it’s not like thi₩'★s is just happening as☆'₹¶ a new thing, the general trend has been on-going"Ω≈ since at least the early 2000s and not only hav♠∞"e the likes of China and Russia been m ♣‍→aking obvious contingency plans, one would be n'®aive to think that the EU is just a®β₹' pure puppet with no independent thought or inter₩π∞est apart from the US.

從(cóng)長(cháng)期來(lá↓←ε≤i)看(kàn)，這(zhè)顯然是(shì)不(bù)✘‍∞♠可(kě)持續的(de)，這(zhè)并不(bù)是(shì)一(yī)•™→件(jiàn)新鮮事(shì)，至少(shǎo)從(cóng)21世★♦‍↑紀初開(kāi)始，這(zhè)種大(dà)趨勢就(¥÷±jiù)一(yī)直在持續，不(bù)僅中國(guó)和(hé)俄羅斯等國(guó)一(yī)直∞δ在制(zhì)定明(míng)顯的(de)應急計(jì)劃，人(rén♠$)們會(huì)天真地(dì)認為(wèi)歐盟隻是(shφ₩β™ì)一(yī)個(gè)純粹的(de)傀儡，除了(l ¶e)美(měi)國(guó)之外(wài)沒有(y★✔ε☆ǒu)獨立的(de)思想或利益。

轉自(zì)汽車(chē)電(diàn)子(zǐ)與軟件(jiàn)